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CREATIVE COMMONS, CC-PLUS, AND HYBRID 





The Creative Commons licensing system is a non-profit organization 
that was founded to promote free use of creative works. Since its launch 
in 2001, this system has inspired a great number of spin-off projects: 
Flickr,1 Wikicommons,2 and ccMixter,3 to name but a few. These 
projects relate to many different fields, including music, movies, 
photographs, scientific articles, and others. While some unique features 
characterize each of these spin-offs, all of these new business ventures 
initially relied on “traditional” Creative Commons licenses.4 
Recently new types of enterprises, such as Beatpick and Jamendo, 
have been launched that use Creative Commons licenses in a slightly 
different way—they rely on the CC-Plus scheme. The CC-Plus scheme 
involves the use of Creative Commons licenses extended to simplify 
commercial use of the newly created works.5 
It appears that no systematic evaluation of these new business 
models has been carried out. Therefore, the purpose of this work is to try 
to fill this gap by analyzing these new enterprises to better understand 
what drives their success and what their main weaknesses are. 
Specifically this study will focus on the digital music market in which 
the CC-Plus protocol may be used to develop a solution to the illegal 
file-sharing problem, a problem which has caused some of the most 
critical litigation in the history of copyright.6  
In particular, Parts II and III will introduce the Creative Commons 
project and the CC-Plus scheme. Part IV will then present a few relevant 
case studies regarding the digital music market. Based on the facts 
presented in Part IV, Part V will attempt to give a critical evaluation of 
these new business ventures, taking into account the viewpoints of all of 
the main stakeholders. Finally, Part VI will discuss some of the issues 
                                                     
* I am much indebted to Frederico Morando and Luigi Russi for their helpful suggestions on 
previous drafts of this paper.  
1 See Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 45, 56; Who Uses CC?, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/who-uses-cc (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
2 See What Is Wikimedia Commons?, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Welcome (last modified Mar. 5, 2011, 10:00 AM); 
Luciano Paccagnella, La gestione della conoscenza nella società dell’informazione: il caso di 
Wikipedia [Managing Knowledge in an Information Society: the Wikipedia Case Study], 2007 
RASSEGNA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA 653, 659 (It.). 
3 See Carroll, supra note 1, at 55. 
4 See infra Part II. 
5 See infra Part III for a more detailed description. 
6 See, e.g., MGM Inc v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
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that seem to be limiting the actual development and implementation of 
CC-Plus systems. 
II. WHAT IS CREATIVE COMMONS? 
Creative Commons is a non-profit organization that was founded in 
2001 with the primary purpose of facilitating free use—including re-use 
and modification—of creative works.7 To do so, a set of licenses is 
issued at no charge to the public, empowering the author of a creative 
work to “keep … copyright while allowing certain uses”8 of his creation. 
In other words, Creative Commons enables protection of creative works 
under a “some rights reserved” copyright instead of the default “all rights 
reserved” copyright that automatically accrues on a work under the 
current intellectual property regime. Under this new system, individuals 
who are interested in uses of the work that have been explicitly permitted 
by the author are no longer required to separately secure an individual 
license. As a result, they encounter lower transaction costs in the process 
of using and reusing the works of others.9 This system is meant to 
increase “the body of work that is available to the public for free and 
legal sharing, use, repurposing, and remixing.”10 
In particular, Creative Commons licenses are characterized by 
“modular contractual terms.”11 These terms can be arranged together to 
create six different types of licenses,12 each one allowing different 
royalty-free uses of the work. The six available options13 are (1) 
Attribution, (2) Attribution Share Alike, (3) Attribution No Derivatives, 
(3) Attribution Non-Commercial, (4) Attribution Non-Commercial Share 
Alike, and (5) Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives.14 These 
licenses are made up of three parts:  
                                                     
7 See Description of Creative Commons’ Vision and Mission, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Apr. 28, 2011); Niva Elkin-Koren, Exploring Creative 
Commons: A Skeptical View of a Worthy Pursuit, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: 
IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 325, 325 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz eds., Kluwer Law International 2006). 
8 CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 7. 
9 Elkin-Koren, supra note 7, at 325. 
10 What is Creative Commons?, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/images/3/35/Creativecommons-what-is-creative-commons_eng.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
11 Elkin-Koren, supra note 7, at 330. 
12 For a list of the licenses, see About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
13 For a detailed description of each of these licenses, see id. 
14 Additional licenses may be tailored to suit the needs of particular communities (for example, 
the sampling licenses for musicians). See Carroll, supra note 1, at 47. 
SPRING 2011  Creative Commons 
104 
 
1. human-readable language (the Commons Deed), which sets out 
the key aspects of the license in a language that is universally 
intelligible;  
2. lawyer-readable language (the Legal Code), which has been 
drafted by a network of lawyers from all of the fifty-two 
jurisdictions where Creative Commons has so far spread; and  
3. machine-readable language (the Digital Code or metadata), 
which enables search engines to identify the licensed work.15 
The choices of these contractual terms give the owners greater 
flexibility as they make their work available to the public. In addition to 
the greater flexibility provided by Creative Commons, one of the slogans 
under which Creative Commons is currently being promoted is “Skip the 
Intermediaries.”16 As stated by Michael Carroll, one of the co-founders 
of Creative Commons, “Creative Commons licenses act as a 
disintermediating force because they enable end-to-end transactions in 
copyrighted works.”17 To better evaluate this benefit, it is helpful to 
separate the two potential classes of creative works uses into non-
commercial and commercial uses. 
Non-commercial use of a work seems to be greatly simplified by the 
Creative Commons system. Since none of the six available licenses 
requires potential users to separately secure an individual license for non-
commercial activities, persons interested in such activities are not 
involved in negotiations and, therefore, no longer need the assistance of 
intermediaries. Hence, looking at non-commercial activities, the Creative 
Commons project seems to be successfully cutting intermediaries out of 
the market by lowering transaction costs for all types of operations. 
On the other hand, the situation becomes more complicated with 
commercial use of creative works. Depending on the license chosen, 
commercial uses are regulated in different ways under the Creative 
Commons regime. While three of the six licenses permit free commercial 
exploitation of a work,18 the remaining three contain a Non-Commercial 
clause, which requires individuals to secure a separate license if the work 
is to be used for commercial purposes. While the former situation does 
not seem to pose significant problems to potential licensees, the latter 
may be slightly problematic. With Non-Commercial licenses, a direct 
                                                     
15 See Frequently Asked Questions, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Frequently_Asked_Questions (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
16 Get Creative!, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/videos/get-creative (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
17 Carroll, supra note 1, at 47. 
18 These are the Attribution, Attribution Share Alike, and Attribution Share Alike No 
Derivatives licenses. 
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bargaining between the author of the work and the potential licensees is 
required, even though such a bargaining process might not always be a 
viable option.  
This problem is especially clear in the case of an extremely valuable 
work with a strong market demand. In this case, the number of would-be 
licensees might be very large. If the author of such a work licenses his 
creation under the Creative Commons regime using a Non-Commercial 
clause, he will be required to carry out a negotiation with each one of the 
aspiring licensees, facing all the associated transaction costs. This might 
decrease the financial reward for the author with respect to the traditional 
combination of ordinary copyright and reliance on collecting societies. 
As a result, the two primary functions of copyright—rewarding the 
investment of the author and incentivizing dissemination of the work19—
might be frustrated. That is where the CC-Plus scheme comes in. 
III. WHAT IS CC-PLUS AND HOW DOES IT WORK? 
As discussed above,20 when an individual author chooses one of the 
Creative Commons licenses containing the Non-Commercial clause, 
transaction costs associated with the negotiation of commercial licenses 
may increase. In this context, Michael Carroll’s assertion that 
“intermediaries are necessary to all kinds of transactions in commerce, 
culture, and news”21 seems to be confirmed. New kinds of intermediating 
bodies that give assistance to the author in the process of negotiating 
commercial licenses might actually be a way to limit the increase in 
transaction costs. In his article, Creative Commons and the New 
Intermediaries, Carroll describes this process of re-intermediation.22 
Search engines, archives, libraries, producers, and publishers are some of 
the examples given by Carroll of entities that have started acting as 
intermediaries in the management of works licensed under the new 
Creative Commons regime. Since the publication of Carroll’s article in 
2006, however, the re-intermediating process has not stopped and one of 
the main reasons for this is the introduction of the CC-Plus scheme. 
                                                     
19 See Maria Lillà Montagnani & Maurizio Borghi, Positive Copyright and Open Content 
Licenses: How to Make a Marriage Work by Empowering Authors to Disseminate Their Creations, 
12 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 244, 248–49 (2008). 
20 See supra Part II. 
21 Carroll, supra note 1, at 45. 
22 Id. 
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CC-Plus is a beta23 protocol launched in 2007 to provide the 
intermediaries mentioned above with a legal infrastructure that they may 
operate within.24 Traditional Creative Commons licenses enable authors 
to retain copyright over their works, while granting specific types of free 
uses. What happens however, if a user wants to acquire rights that extend 
beyond those granted by Creative Commons licenses? An example is the 
commercial use of a creation licensed with a Non-Commercial Creative 
Commons license. The CC-Plus protocol empowers the author to license 
his work with Creative Commons and at the same time specify, for 
example, a broker that would handle rights that go beyond the scope of a 
Creative Commons license.25 Technically, this is done by adding a “more 
permissions” link to the traditional Creative Commons icons that usually 
accompany a work, which leads to the site of a broker. The broker offers 
an infrastructure to channel the demand for rights of commercial 
exploitation over the author’s creation, so as to increase standardization 
and to lower transaction costs.26 This way, the author manages to offer 
his work to the public free of charge for non-commercial use, but at the 
same time he is provided with an easy way to issue commercial licenses 
to those interested in the work for commercial uses.27 The architecture of 
the CC-Plus scheme enables a commercial economy to co-exist with, or 
be grafted onto, the sharing economy created by the Creative Commons 
system.28 
The potential applications for this protocol are countless. In fact, the 
model has already been adopted by several companies operating in 
different domains such as Blip.tv in the field of video sharing, or Pump 
Audio in the field of musical compositions.29 
IV. A FEW CASE STUDIES FROM THE DIGITAL MUSIC MARKET 
Since the release of the CC-Plus protocol in 2007, many new 
ventures have tried to build business models that offer this licensing 
                                                     
23 In this article, the term beta is used to describe a protocol that is undergoing a test phase. A 
beta version of software is described as “the first working version distributed to external customers.” 
Alan MacCormack, Product-Development Practices that Work: How Internet Companies Build 
Software, 42 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 75, 79 (2001). 
24 See CC and CC+ Overview for the World Wide Web, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/images/3/37/Creativecommons-ccplus-overview-for-the-world-
wide-web_eng.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter CC and CC+ Overview]. 
25 Id. 
26 See Press Release, Creative Commons, Creative Commons Launches CC0 and CC+ 
Programs (Dec. 17, 2007), http://creativecommons.org/press-releases/entry/7919. 
27 Id. 
28 See CC and CC+ Overview, supra note 24. 
29 See Press Release, Creative Commons, supra note 26. 
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scheme. Looking at the domain of music, several different websites have 
been launched in an attempt to successfully adopt the protocol. 
A few case studies are reported below as further evidence of how the 
CC-Plus protocol has been implemented in practice. The business 
ventures listed below are just some of the projects that have been 
launched. They have been preferred over their competitors30 in this work 
because more information and data is currently available for them, 
perhaps because of the greater visibility acquired by these websites. 
Moreover, the three Internet sites hereafter analyzed present most of the 
key features of these developing business models. Thus, they also 
provide a good summary of the core structure of open music licensing 
systems. The following analysis casts some light upon the possible future 
evolution of the digital music market. 
A. Beatpick.com 
Launched in February 2006,31 Beatpick.com is an Internet site whose 
core business is music licensing.32 Since its inception, Beatpick has 
undergone considerable development. The available data attests to this 
progress. Besides opening international offices in the United Kingdom 
and Italy, Beatpick has provided licenses for over 3,000 music tracks 
produced by 120 artists,33 and has partnered with important brands such 
as Mercedes Benz, Ralph Lauren, and 20th Century Fox.34 It has even 
launched a spin-off project, called SoundReef.35 
To better understand the determinants of this intensive growth, it is 
useful to examine its key features carefully and break down the website’s 
structure to point out its key functioning principles. 
1) How Users Benefit 
                                                     
30 Other websites include Youlicense, www.youlicense.com; Pumpaudio, 
www.pumpaudio.com; and Opsound, www.opsound.org. See id.; Michael W. Carroll, Creative 
Commons as Conversational Copyright, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 445, 454 (Peter K. Yu ed., Greenwood 
Publishing Group 2007). 
31 Does the World Still Need a Beatpick?, BEATPICK (Oct. 7, 2008), 
http://blog.beatpick.com/does-the-world-still-need-a-beatpick/. 
32 Beatpick Study, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Beatpick_study (last 
modified Sept. 3, 2010, 8:22 PM) [hereinafter Beatpick Study]. 
33 The data refers to October, 2007. See id. 
34 FAQ, BEATPICK, http://www.beatpick.com/intro/faq (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter 
FAQ]. 
35 See BeatPick.com presents… SoundReef!!!, BEATPICK (Nov. 14, 2008), 
http://blog.beatpick.com/2008/11/. 
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Beatpick has built its end-user appeal on a few important aspects. 
First of all, even though the website supports a very wide variety of 
artists and genres, a thorough quality control is carried out over music 
tracks. Beatpick generally accepts only 10% of over two hundred 
submissions per month.36 
Besides quality and diversity, another important aspect of Beatpick is 
its pricing policy. While the website does not charge for non-commercial 
uses, rights for commercial use can be secured at prices that are up to 
70% lower37 than those offered by collecting societies for licenses 
encompassing the same uses. 
Finally, like all works licensed with Creative Commons, Beatpick’s 
music compositions are distributed with no technological measures of 
protection. The absence of digital rights management (DRM) protective 
measures, together with other services offered by the site, such as the 
possibility to preview all works and the option to re-download tracks 
after the initial purchase, facilitate quick and easy access to the database 
of songs. 
In summary, Beatpick’s four main selling points are quality, 
diversity, pricing, and quick and easy access to the database. 
2) How Artists Benefit 
As outlined by Beatpick’s CEO David d’Atri, “artists are in different 
segments of the market depending on the status of their careers.”38 
Beatpick tries to address their specific needs and goals by providing 
them with “an extra tool”39 to earn money and to gain exposure.40 This is 
achieved by offering artists non-exclusive agreements, which can be 
terminated anytime with a thirty-day notice. Beatpick uses Creative 
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share Alike licenses by default. 
According to d’Atri, these serve as the “perfect legal framework for the 
label”41 because they balance “the need to make a living with the need 
for advertisement.”42 These licenses are characterized by a flexibility that 
                                                     
36 See FAQ, supra note 34. 
37 For example, webradios to be broadcasted in public or private spaces. See Beatpick Study, 
supra note 32. 
38 David d’Atri, CEO, Beatpick.com – SoundReef.com, Powerpoint Presentation at Bocconi 
University: Intellectual Property—Legal Management of IPRs (Nov. 11, 2008), 
http://www.antitrustisti.net/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_view/gid,912/Itemid,32/. 
39 FAQ, supra note 34. 
40 See id. 
41 Beatpick Study, supra note 32. 
42 Id. With the expressions “need to make a living” and “need for advertisement,” d’Atri seems 
to be referring to the situation of those artists that choose to sacrifice their short-term gains to 
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could be appealing not only to amateur musicians, but perhaps even to 
professional artists. 
In addition, artists profit from contributing to the website in many 
different ways: earnings from a track distributed through Beatpick are 
split evenly between the site and the artist, backend royalties belong 
entirely to the musician, and artists gain free advertising from 
participating in the project.43 
3) Philosophy 
Naturally Beatpick shares the vision that lies behind the Creative 
Commons project. Indeed, they give support to “people who remix, 
podcast, or create multimedia projects with [their] music and disseminate 
it on the web.”44 
An important reason for participating in the Creative Commons 
project is that Beatpick understands that “non-commercial uses simply 
would not happen[—]or worse[,] would happen illegally[—]in today’s 
music market.”45 Hence, its developers prefer to “encourage correct 
name association/credits and adapt to these situations, which may well 
turn into commercial opportunities in the future.”46 Thus, Beatpick’s 
implementation of the CC-Plus protocol might also be due to a belief that 
Creative Commons could actually be a valid response to illegal file 
sharing. 
However, in implementing the Creative Commons system, Beatpick 
follows a rather prudent line. The website still exercises some control 
over free downloading of tracks for allegedly non-commercial uses. In 
such circumstances, users are required to provide Beatpick with their 
name, email address, and a description of the intended use of the song. 
Moreover, in browsing Beatpick’s website, it appears that the download 
of certain tracks for specific non-commercial uses, like Listening 
Pleasure, are not permitted at all even upon payment. Therefore, it looks 
like Beatpick has taken several different precautionary measures to 
prevent abuse of the Creative Commons licensing scheme. 
B. Jamendo.com 
                                                                                                                       




45 FAQ, supra note 34. 
46 Id. 
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The second business venture that deserves a more detailed analysis is 
Jamendo. This music platform—founded in Luxembourg in May 2004—
offers the largest catalog of tracks licensed with Creative Commons.47 At 
the time of this writing, Jamendo has published over 40,000 albums and 
has over 600,000 active members.48 The website’s persistent 
development is also attested by the fact that Jamendo’s customers 
include names such as Ducati and Skoda.49 In July 2007, this business 
venture was even targeted by Mangrovia Capital Partners, a 
Luxembourg-based venture capital company that decided to invest in this 
project.50 The reasons behind Jamendo’s prosperity are numerous, and an 
analysis of its key features is useful in trying to single them out. Even 
though Jamendo’s model presents many similarities to Beatpick’s, 
several important differences exist between the two websites that should 
be noted. 
1) How Users Benefit 
From a user’s point of view, Jamendo offers free, simple, and quick 
access to a very large database of musical compositions, which may 
either be downloaded through a peer-to-peer system or be accessed via 
streaming.51 For such purposes, users are not required to register with the 
website, even though they do have an option to do so. Furthermore, just 
like Beatpick’s tracks, files downloaded from Jamendo are not protected 
with DRM technologies.52 
One unique feature of Jamendo which deserves emphasis is its 
community rating system.53 To grant a quality service to users, Jamendo 
provides them with a set of tools to distribute, catalog, and rate music.54 
These tools facilitate the selection of tracks by website visitors. 
2) How Artists Benefit 
                                                     
47 See FAQ, JAMENDO, http://www.jamendo.com/en/faq (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) 
[hereinafter Jamendo FAQ]. 
48 See JAMENDO, http://www.jamendo.com/en/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
49 See Jamendo PRO FAQ, JAMENDO, http://pro.jamendo.com/en/faq/41 (last visited Apr. 28, 
2011). 
50 See CREATIVE COMMONS CLINIC ET AL., BUILDING AN AUSTRALASIAN COMMONS: 
CREATIVE COMMONS CASE STUDIES, VOLUME 1, at 24 (Rachel Cobcroft ed., Creative Commons 
Clinic, Austl. Research Council Ctr. of Excellence for Creative Indus. & Innovation 2008), available 
at http://www.scribd.com/doc/35020016/Building-an-Australasian-Commons-Case-Studies-
Volume-1. 
51 See Choose Streaming and Downloading Options, JAMENDO (Feb. 21, 2008), 
http://blog.jamendo.com/2008/02/21/choose-streaming-and-download-options/. 
52 See CREATIVE COMMONS CLINIC ET AL., supra note 50, at 25. 
53 See id. at 23. 
54 See id. at 25. 
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Unlike Beatpick, Jamendo does not have a default license. Artists 
have the opportunity to choose any of the existing Creative Commons 
licenses, and they may even resort to Free Art licensing, “a French 
copyleft [license] applying to works of art.”55 The reasons for employing 
Creative Commons licenses, according to Chief Technology Officer 
Sylvain Zimmer, are the flexibility offered to the artists, the clarity of the 
Commons Deed and the quality of the Legal Code and the Digital Code, 
and the unceasing expansion of the community supporting Creative 
Commons.56  
For these reasons Creative Commons licenses constitute Jamendo’s 
legal framework, which represents a useful tool for musicians to publish 
their works in the way that most suits their needs. This is an aspect of the 
website that should be very appealing to artists. 
In addition, there are several features that have been designed to 
attract musicians to the website. In particular, Jamendo emphasizes three 
aspects of its Internet site:57 
1. It is a non-exclusive platform. While contributing to Jamendo’s 
database, artists have the option to enter agreements with other 
licensing companies, even involving the same tracks. 
2. It is a zero-cost platform. Thanks to its peer-to-peer distributing 
system, Jamendo manages to keep the costs of hosting files 
rather low. This enables the website to offer free hosting services 
to musicians and, at the same time, limits the volume of 
advertisement required to fund the site, keeping it at a minimal 
level. 
3. It is a free platform. Artists are free to terminate their agreement 
at any time, and remove their music from Jamendo.com. This 
leaves the artist free, for example, to sign an exclusive contract 
with other recording companies. 
However, it is important to point out that use of this hosting service 
is not always possible for artists registered with certain collective rights 
societies, such as the Italian Società Italiana degli Autori ed Editori 
(SIAE), whose contracts might be exclusive and might therefore prevent 
artists from making their music available for free on the Internet.58 
                                                     
55 Case Studies: Jamendo, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Case_Studies/Jamendo_Study (last modified Dec. 16, 2010, 7:49 
PM). 
56 See CREATIVE COMMONS CLINIC ET AL., supra note 50, at 26. 
57 See id. at 23. 
58 See Jamendo FAQ, supra note 47; infra Part V.E. It is important to specify that such an 
incompatibility between the mandates of some collecting societies and individual licensing choices 
of authors is not specific to Jamendo, but applies, in general, to Creative Commons and similar 
licensing schemes. 
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Artists have economic incentives to contribute to Jamendo’s 
database besides the simplicity and versatility of the website and the 
potential visibility that may be acquired by participating in the project. 
For instance, the website grants three forms of financial reward for 




1. Donations: members of Jamendo.com are encouraged to support 
their favorite artists by making donations. The minimum 
donation allowed is five dollars and Jamendo retains an 
administrative fee on each donation. The fee is set to a level that 
allows artists to earn at least 90% of the original donation. 
2. Advertisements: Jamendo shares 50% of the revenue generated 
through advertising with its contributors, according to each 
user’s statistics such as page views.  
3. Commercial uses: artists have the option to enter the commercial 
programs set up by the music platform. In this situation, a 
minimum of 50% of the associated licenses fees are paid to the 
artist. 
 
                                                     
59 See Michael Jonathan Todosichuk, Understanding Musical Artists’ Motivation to Share 
Creative Commons Licensed Musical Works: Applying Social Capital and Social Cognitive Theory 
(June 2009) (unpublished master’s thesis, National Cheng Kung University), available at 
http://etdncku.lib.ncku.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/getfile?URN=etd-0719109-
173414&filename=etd-0719109-173414.pdf; Jamendo FAQ, supra note 47. 
 
Picture 1.  Jamendo.com: sources of revenue for the artist. 





Even though each of these three channels is designed to remunerate 
artists, it is important to point out the fact that, in practice, donations tend 
to be a minor stream of income for musicians.60 
3) Other features 
One of the website’s main strengths is the community that has 
formed around it through the interaction between artists and users. For 
example, artists can create their own profile on Jamendo.com where they 
can post photos or announce events. In turn, users submit reviews, create 
playlists, signal their favorite works to the community, and much more.61 
These activities play a key role in Jamendo’s business model. 
Users’ activities also contribute to building up a valuable database of 
information about visitors’ preferences and artists’ performances on the 
website. Their comments and discussions help assess the value of a 
work, at least as perceived by the website’s visitors. The statistics 
gathered based on their feedback are made available to the public and 
represent a valuable asset for the site’s future development. By 
interacting with each other, users start understanding that they are part of 
a collaboration space and regard themselves as part of a community. This 
message could be critical in supporting sharing activities like those 
promoted by Jamendo. 
4) Philosophy 
This music platform has been designed to encourage the circulation 
of creative works, foster exchange, and promote creativity.62 Jamendo’s 
founder and CEO Laurent Kratz described the website’s activity as 
“economically supporting and promoting the long tail of music.”63 This 
is accomplished by promoting diversity in the music industry. This 
vision matches the Creative Commons objectives. Furthermore, the 
website’s considerable development provides empirical evidence that the 
Creative Commons system may be a viable alternative to the traditional 
                                                     
60 See CREATIVE COMMONS CLINIC ET AL., supra note 50, at 24. 
61 See Case Studies: Jamendo, supra note 55.  
62 See FAQ: How it Works, JAMENDO, http://www.jamendo.com/en/faq (last visited Apr. 28, 
2011).  
63 See Case Studies: Jamendo, supra note 55. The term long tail of music refers to a business 
theory developed by Chris Anderson. According to this theory, “in an era without the constraints of 
physical shelf space and other bottlenecks of distribution, narrowly targeted goods and services can 
be as economically attractive as mainstream fare.” CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE 
FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE 52 (Hyperion ed. 2008). 
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copyright system or a form of sustainable evolution of the traditional 
system. 
C. Magnatune.com 
Magnatune is the final example of a music platform adopting the 
CC-Plus scheme. It is the oldest venture of those discussed. Founded in 
2003 by John Buckman, Magnatune.com is an online record label that 
“has been a leader in the implementation of the CC-Plus protocol.”64 
Like its competitors, Magnatune has managed to acquire great visibility 
and build a valuable open-music database. Magnatune currently has 328 
artists that have used Magnatune’s platform for the distribution of 10,079 
songs.65 
1) How users benefit 
Magnatune’s first selling point is diversity. The website is meant to 
be a platform for “music that gets little radio airplay or major record 
distribution, but has a fairly large audience.”66 In fact, the Internet site 
hosts tracks from many different genres—from “Electronica” to “New 
Age” music. 
What distinguishes Magnatune from other music platforms, however, 
is the pricing model used. Fares on Magnatune vary depending on 
multiple factors. For commercial uses, Magnatune acts as a broker in 
setting the prices for such licenses. On the other hand, dealing with non-
commercial licenses is slightly more complicated. In this case, users have 
two options: they may choose a free download of a 128k mp3 file that 
contains advertising, or they may purchase a higher quality download or 
a physical CD, both advertisement free.  
In the latter situation, the buyer decides how much to spend on the 
album.67 Payments range from $5 to $18, but the suggested price for a 
purchase is $8. Surprisingly, a recent study showed that users pay an 
average of $8.20 per album—a price that is higher than both the 
minimum price and the suggested price.68 
                                                     
64 CREATIVE COMMONS CLINIC ET AL., supra note 50, at 29. 
65 Magnatune Statistics: What Sells?, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/stats/ 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
66 The Business Model: How We (and Our Artists) Pay the Rent, MAGNATUNE, 
http://www.magnatune.com/info/model (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
67 See What Is “Open Music”?, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/openmusic 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011); Key Attributes of Magnatune.com for Various Audiences, MAGNATUNE, 
http://www.magnatune.com/info/attribs (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Key Attributes]. 
68 Tobias Regner & Javier A. Barria, Do Consumers Pay Voluntarily: The Case of Online 
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This variable pricing system also plays an important role in orienting 
consumers. By choosing what amount of money to spend, customers 
unveil their willingness to pay and, as a result, statistics on the best-
selling albums are available on the website and act as signals for 
potential buyers to assist them in their purchases. 
In addition, Magnatune’s developers have designed other 
mechanisms to ensure quality of service: a peer editorial approval 
process carried out by artists already on the label,69 and a quality 
assessment performed by the website’s administrators. This selection is 
meant to “[give] credibility to musicians who are accepted”70 and 
guarantees a predefined quality standard for the works distributed 
through the music platform.  
Another mechanism used is a service of free “webradios” that plays a 
significant role in guiding the audience in its buying process. Unlike 
Jamendo, Magnatune does not rely heavily on a community rating 
system, even though the site does host discussion forums. Finally, 
another feature that might be appealing to Magnatune’s users is that 
downloaded files have no DRM protections attached to them and there is 
no review of the use of licensed music.71 
2) How artists benefit 
Magnatune describes one of the big concepts behind its experiment 
by saying “[t]he systematic destruction of musician[s’] lives is 
unacceptable.”72 One of Magnatune’s purposes is to “help artists get 
exposure, make at least as much money they would make with traditional 
labels, and help them get fans and concerts.”73 
In particular, artists collaborating with Magnatune have three main 
sources of income: 50% of the price of each album, 50% of the revenue 
derived from any commercial sub-licensing, and 50% of the 
merchandising revenues.74 These channels should represent a form of 
“incremental income”75 for contributors. 
                                                     
69 See The Plan: Problems With the Music Industry and How Magnatune Is Trying to Fix 
Them, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/plan (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
70 Key Attributes, supra note 67. 
71 See id. 
72 The Big Ideas, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/ethos (last visited Apr. 28, 
2011). 
73 John Buckman, Founder’s Rant, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/why (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
74 The Business Model: How We (and Our Artists) Pay the Rent, supra note 66. 
75 See Key Attributes, supra note 67. 
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The music platform offers its artists the opportunity to license their 
works under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share 
Alike license and to sign a non-exclusive agreement with Magnatune 
with a standard duration of five years.76 As Magnatune itself 
acknowledges, this “[n]onexclusive relationship with musicians means 
lower Magnatune investment in artists, more investment in promoting 
itself and the entire catalog.”77 The website actually invests money in 
advertising78 and all tracks distributed for free for non-commercial uses 
contain advertisements for the website. Through its actions, 
Magnatune.com manages to make non-exclusive agreements79 
convenient both for its artists and for the netlabel itself. 
D. Summary 
For ease of comparison, the chart in the Appendix summarizes the 
main features of the three websites’ business models. 
V. A STAKEHOLDER’S PERSPECTIVE 
Having presented these three business ventures it is critical to 
evaluate their structures based on the viewpoints of the main 
stakeholders: artists, users, recording companies, the legal system, 
collection societies, and society as a whole. 
A. Artists  
It is difficult to accurately evaluate artists’ motivations for turning to 
these new intermediaries for aid in the commercial exploitation of their 
creations. As Beatpick’s CEO David d’Atri observed,80 the artist 
category is very broad and includes different classes of musicians, each 
with different needs and goals. Nevertheless, it is important to assess 
their perspective, taking into account the diverse composition of this 
                                                     
76 See Mike Linksvayer, Beatpick Flatters Magnatune Business Model, CREATIVE COMMONS 
(Mar. 6, 2006), http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/5810. 
77 Key Attributes, supra note 67. 
78 See What We Do for Our Musicians, MAGNATUNE, 
http://www.magnatune.com/info/whatwedo (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
79 The generic version of a Magnatune contract is characterized by a non-exclusivity clause. 
The generic terms of the contract are available at 
http://magnatune.com/artists/license/license_template.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). The 
platform, however, allows artists to negotiate custom agreements with Magnatune too. See License 
Music at Magnatune, MAGNATUNE, http://magnatune.com/info/license (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
80 See d’Atri, supra note 38. 
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category of stakeholders. Using d’Atri’s typology, musicians can be 
classified into five categories:81 
1. “Quality professionals”—these are famous artists with 
substantial bargaining power in their negotiations with 
customers. Exhibition sales for these artists are strong. 
2. “Professionals”—these are non-famous artists with limited 
bargaining power in their negotiations with customers. These 
musicians are still capable of making a living out of their careers. 
3. “Developing professionals”—these are non-famous artists with 
very weak bargaining power in their negotiations with 
customers. Exhibition sales for these artists are not strong 
enough to enable them to live off their artistic career. The main 
concern for these artists is that of acquiring visibility. 
4. “Students”—these are artists who still need to complete a 
specific learning process to become professionals. These non-
famous artists do not have any bargaining power in their 
negotiations with customers and do not make a living out of their 
artistic activity. 
5. “Amateurs”—these are artists who compose and perform music 
just as a hobby or as a passion. 
Of these groups, quality professionals in particular are a very critical 
category for the ultimate success of these new business models. Famous 
musicians might be the market players that are less willing to change the 
current situation, which presently favors them. This is due to music being 
an informational good.82 Because of this feature of music, a 
“superstardom effect” characterizes the music market. Consumers tend to 
minimize their search and sampling costs by listening primarily to works 
of artists with a well-established reputation.83 The Creative Commons 
system and the CC-Plus protocol would lower search and sampling costs 
and might therefore undermine the superstardom effect. 
On the other hand, studies have shown that this sampling might also 
have a positive effect for artists. Because music is an informational good, 
and because sampling enables consumers to make a more informed 
purchase decision, consumers might be more willing to pay more for the 
tracks they desire if they can sample the tracks before they purchase 
them.84 Therefore, if sufficient incentives to purchase a paid version of 
                                                     
81 Id. 
82 See Sudip Bhattacharjee et al., The Effect of Digital Sharing Technologies on Music 
Markets: A Survival Analysis of Albums on Ranking Charts, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1359, 1362 (2007). 
83 See Moshe Adler, Stardom and Talent, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 208, 212. (1985). 
84 See Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, Why the Music Industry May Gain from Free 
Downloading—The Role of Sampling, 24 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 907, 912 (2006). 
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the song were created,85 it would be possible to leverage a financial 
return out of sharing and sampling activities. This is exactly what 
Magnatune does—it offers lower quality versions of the songs for free 
for non-commercial use, thereby providing a means for sampling. Then, 
it proposes higher quality versions, which are sold using a variable 
pricing system. 
Thus, the introduction of the CC-Plus protocol may have two 
opposite effects on famous artists’ revenues: the erosion of the 
“superstardom effect,” which leads to lower revenues, and the increased 
“willingness-to-pay” effect, which can be leveraged to increase revenues. 
Depending on the relative strength of the two contrasting effects, the 
publication of works using the CC-Plus protocol may or may not be 
advantageous for well-known artists. Predicting which one of the two 
effects will be dominant is difficult because the outcome depends on the 
specific artist and the specific features of the music platform chosen. 
A curious experiment carried out by the famous band Radiohead is 
an example of a real-life situation in which making an album available to 
the public for sharing purposes actually turned out to be a profitable 
initiative for a well-known group of musicians. In 2007, Radiohead 
decided to make their album In Rainbows available for download directly 
from their own website, giving their fans an option to pay whatever 
amount of money they wanted for it, including nothing.86 This 
downloading option remained available for exactly two months.87 The 
initiative facilitated sharing and sampling of the album by consumers 
and, surprisingly enough, overall revenues from the campaign exceeded 
revenues from previous albums.88 Even though no Creative Commons 
license was used by the band, this experiment constitutes a valid example 
of artists sharing their works with the public and leveraging value in a 
way that empowers them and actually increases their income. 
For the lesser-known categories of artists—“professionals,” 
“developing professionals,” “students,” and “amateurs”—the analysis 
becomes much more straightforward. From their viewpoint, the erosion 
of the “superstardom effect” does not have a negative effect on their 
revenues. In fact, by lowering searching and sampling costs, Creative 
                                                     
85 See Sudip Bhattacharjee et al., Whatever Happened to Payola? An Empirical Analysis of 
Online Music Sharing, 42 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 104, 118 (2006). 
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87 New Radiohead Album Coming Out October 10th, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 30, 2007), 
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Commons and the CC-Plus protocol will only benefit unknown artists by 
helping them become known by potential consumers. 
Furthermore, CC-Plus intermediaries may be a way for unknown 
artists to gain exposure and promote live events, which constitute a main 
source of income for non-bestselling artists.89 Hence, implementation of 
the CC-Plus protocol does not seem to threaten obscure artists’ revenues. 
Indeed, lesser-known artists may be the market players benefiting the 
most from these new business models. 
So far only artists’ financial or economic motivations in licensing 
their works under a Creative Commons license have been discussed. 
However, they may also have non-economic motivations for creating 
new works. For example, a 2006 study suggests that “[i]nnovation in the 
creative commons is driven by a set of motives (desire for excellence, 
self-expression, altruism and sheer enjoyment) that may be broadly 
classed as creative rather than monetary or organizational.”90 These 
creative motives may well encourage artists—both famous and 
obscure—to share their works for non-monetary reasons. 
To explain artist’s motivations for sharing their works, Michael 
Todosichuk has applied social cognitive theory to explain artists’ 
motivation to share. He found that four factors appear to be “positively 
associated with the Quantity of Creative Works Shared.”91 These are (1) 
“Identification with the Creative Commons virtual community,”92 (2) 
“Shared Vision”93 within the community, (3) “Positive Personal 
Outcome Expectations”94 within the community, and (4) “Positive 
Community-related Outcome Expectations” within the community.95  
According to Todosichuk, to motivate artists it is important to act on 
these four levels. To do so it is crucial to build a thriving community 
behind the music platform. Jamendo is a good practical example of an 
Internet site with such community support. 
Business models implementing the CC-Plus protocol may, from a 
monetary perspective, primarily be attractive to non-famous artists. They 
may also become interesting to well-known artists if such business 
ventures adequately manage to leverage value out of these new channels 
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of distribution. Moreover, non-monetary factors may also be valuable 
tools in motivating both famous and non-famous artists to contribute to 
these new hybrid economies. 
One article suggests that the market for music items might display 
network externalities, such as fan clubs sharing information.96 Taking 
this idea into account, the CC-Plus scheme can also be thought of as a 
means for authors to facilitate the initial diffusion of their creations. This 
initial diffusion is a critical phase of the commercialization process in 
industries that exhibit network externalities.97 
B. Users 
All of these business ventures offer several benefits for users and 
visitors of the music platforms. First, the websites provide their visitors 
with free access to their content for non-commercial purposes. Even 
Beatpick, whose developers appear to be controlling access to the tracks 
to prevent abuse of the Creative Commons licenses,98 allows free, 
specifically non-commercial uses of its database. 
Second, with these new intermediaries being launched, commercial 
use of creative works is substantially simplified as well. Besides offering 
lower fares for music licensing, these Internet sites standardize the 
negotiation process for acquiring rights to a work. As Creative Commons 
founder Lawrence Lessig pointed out, “costs of negotiating and clearing 
the rights”99 are currently noteworthy.100 Purchasing music through these 
new intermediating entities might be a viable way to reduce such costs. 
Aside from offering simple and quick access to creative works, these 
new business ventures are characterized by another important strength: 
they distribute works which would otherwise be unavailable to the public 
and, consequently, they offer customers a great variety of content. 
Consumers benefit from having a wider choice, as they will be more 
likely to encounter tracks that cater to their musical tastes. 
                                                     
96 See Ram D. Gopal et al., Do Artists Benefit from Online Music Sharing?, 79 J. BUS. 1503, 
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Third, another advantage to the implementation of this new protocol 
is that it enables users to carry out sharing and sampling activities 
without violating the law and risking criminal conviction. This is a great 
incentive to use these new music platforms. 
This form of licensing also increases possibilities for users to remix 
and repurpose creative works in a completely legal way as long as the 
terms of the Creative Commons license are respected. Easing remixing 
activities may help a new form of culture development, advocated by 
Lessig, called the “Read/Write culture.”101 It is a system in which users 
not only develop their knowledge through exposure to the existing 
culture, but also contribute to the bulk of works with their remixing 
activities. 
The final advantage to users is that due to the absence of DRM 
protections on the distributed files, these ventures give greater 
opportunities for users to time- and space-shift the purchased material. 
This is an important point. As Lessig points out, “[t]he expectation of 
access on demand builds slowly”102 and “at a certain point, perfect access 
(meaning the ability to get whatever you want whenever you want it) will 
seem obvious.”103 Thus, in the future, restrictions on the use of purchased 
songs might be perceived as unreasonable and might consequently lead 
to a drop in sales for the enterprises still applying such constraints. With 
this in mind, music platforms that do not use these technologies or 
restrictions, such as Beatpick, Jamendo or Magnatune, appear to better 
suit the needs of users.104 
The paragraphs above describe just some of the many potential user 
benefits. However, since these new business ventures operate in a hybrid 
economy which, to succeed, requires all of its players to benefit on 
balance,105 it might be important to find out whether users not only 
benefit, but contribute in some way to this sharing economy. 
To emphasize this critical feature of these new business ventures, the 
role of consumers must be examined. In using the music platforms, 
consumers do not only gain simple, and mostly free, access to musical 
content but also, as a by-product of their sampling activities, they must 
provide the website and the music market with important information 
about their listening habits. Since music is an informational good, music 
platforms and recording companies may use this consumer information 
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to better evaluate the true quality and expected sales of the tracks that 
they are planning to distribute. Just like their predecessors, Jamendo, 
Magnatune, and Beatpick may take advantage of the activities of their 
users. “Simply by listening to music, members generate value for the 
community.”106 
While consumers may benefit in many different ways from the use of 
the newly launched music platforms they would not be taking unfair 
advantage of the artists’ contributions because their activities provide 
these sharing economies with valuable information in return. 
C. Recording Companies 
As mentioned above, the Creative Commons project is campaigned 
as a way to “skip the intermediaries.”107 Yet, the implementation of the 
CC-Plus protocol might indicate that intermediating bodies are actually 
necessary in the music market.108 Several articles emphasize the need for 
entities that would help consumers filter the incredible amount of 
musical works available on the market.109 In this re-intermediating 
process, however, it appears that recording companies might be replaced 
by a group of new online music platforms, including sites using the CC-
Plus protocol. One commentator in particular suggest that “new online 
distribution technologies . . . are likely to decrease the role of labels,”110 
taking up some of the functions that have been carried out by labels in 
the past. 
However, the development of new business models does not have to 
be seen as a replacement of recording companies. Instead, these new 
ventures may be seen as a potential source of inspiration for traditional 
record labels, encouraging them to improve their own structure. 
According to one report, the music industry had a decline in the sales of 
physical formats and an increase in digital sales in 2009.111 This report 
also noted that the increase in the weight of digital sales is not a new 
phenomenon, but rather constitutes an established trend.112 This trend 
started eight years ago in the United States. If the music industry keeps 
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evolving in the same fashion in the coming years, the CC-Plus protocol 
might represent an interesting opportunity for recording companies to 
adapt to the changing environment. 
Surprisingly, creating business ventures that enable legal digital 
download of music files might actually turn out to be a profitable 
strategy for major labels. Indeed, there are many reasons why the hybrid 
intermediaries analyzed in the previous paragraphs may actually generate 
net financial gains for recording companies. 
First, by promoting lesser-known artists, these Internet sites offer 
great diversity. Using the “long tail principle,” Chris Anderson explained 
that in a market characterized by low inventory costs, such as the digital 
music market, offering variety may be an important factor in trying to 
outperform competitors.113 
Second, the music industry has traditionally been characterized by a 
phenomenon where only a few albums turn out to be profitable out of all 
the albums released by a recording company. These new systems might 
actually help generate more profits for recording companies. According 
to a study published by the Los Angeles Times, only one act out of ten 
manages to generate profits.114 An extensive part of these profits goes to 
compensating losses derived from the release of the remaining 
unprofitable albums. Recording companies might decrease these losses 
in the new distributing systems, where information about users’ 
preferences is available. Recording companies might find it easier to 
effectively predict which albums are going to be successful, and thus be 
able to concentrate their investments on those acts that are most likely to 
succeed. This could lead to a less risky and more profitable business for 
the recording companies.115 
Even though free and legal downloading systems are likely to cause 
a further decrease in the sales of recorded music, it is important to note 
that there are many ways in which financial return may be leveraged out 
of these new sharing economies; for example, by adding incentives to 
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pay for enhanced versions of the downloaded files. These solutions have 
been described above.116 
In spite of all of these advantages to the recording companies, it 
would be unrealistic to say that they should be able to reach the same 
level of profits they had when online music sharing did not yet exist. 
With the launch of these new music platforms, the music market, which 
has historically been monopolized by only five major recording 
companies,117 would open up to a much larger number of intermediaries. 
The relinquishment of this oligopoly would probably lead to lower 
profits for the major labels controlling the market. Despite this, by 
integrating their own business models into this new protocol, recording 
companies might still be able to profit from their activity. Eventually, 
this change could actually help them compete with piracy effectively, by 
providing users with a legal downloading service. In the end, all of the 
above-mentioned factors could also help labels remove the negative 
image that certain individuals associate with the major recording 
companies.118 
D. Legal System 
One of the primary challenges for the copyright regime currently in 
force is balancing the two original functions of copyright, namely 
“rewarding creativity and … disseminating knowledge.”119 By offering a 
way to reconcile commercial exploitation of a work with non-
commercial dissemination, the CC-Plus protocol appears to be a 
significant step forward in that direction. 
From a legal perspective the CC-Plus scheme also addresses some of 
the strongest critiques of the Creative Commons project. For example, 
Niva Elkin-Koren has argued that this new licensing system is “reducing 
the cost of licensing,”120 and thus is providing individual authors “with 
an efficient mechanism to execute their intellectual property rights.”121 In 
her opinion, this will encourage individual authors using Creative 
Commons licenses to “set limits on the exploitation of their works.”122 In 
addition, she claims that such a new licensing system might be 
unnecessary since, before its inception, “many works were posted online 
without any restrictions, on the implicit presumption that re-use is 
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permissible for non-commercial purposes.”123 Creative Commons 
licenses and the CC-Plus scheme, however, are intended to lower 
transaction costs for users of creative works—not for creators of the 
works124—by providing individual authors with an inexpensive tool to 
facilitate free use of their works. If an author wishes to make a profit out 
of his or her work, the most economical way to do so is still to rely on 
the traditional copyright, which automatically accrues on creative works 
and which does not require authors to invest time and money in trying to 
modify the contractual terms of its copyright with a Creative Commons 
license. The CC-Plus scheme also empowers authors who are not seeking 
immediate economic returns from their works to transform what was 
before just an implicit presumption into an explicit statement. This 
change may be very valuable in trying to reinforce the principle of legal 
certainty and, consequently, in simplifying the process of re-using 
creative works. 
A second critique of the Creative Commons system raised by Elkin-
Koren concerns the “lack of standardization,”125 that results from the six 
different available licensing schemes available. She claims that such a 
lack of standardization increases “the cost of determining the duties and 
privileges related to any specific work.”126 Her concern is that by 
providing authors with six different licensing options, the Creative 
Commons system is likely to lead to “information costs”127 for third 
parties interested in creating derivative works without violating 
intellectual property law. This critique captures one of Creative 
Commons’ main weaknesses and the CC-Plus protocol does not 
specifically identify a solution. Yet, looking at the practical applications 
of the protocol that have been analyzed above, it seems that in practice 
business models complying with the CC-Plus protocol tend to 
circumvent the problem by adopting a single standard license. 
Magnatune and Beatpick, for example, do not give their users the ability 
to choose which Creative Commons license to use. Instead, all tracks 
hosted by these two music platforms have a standard Attribution Non-
Commercial Share Alike license. 
A final critique that has been raised against the Creative Commons 
licenses is that such licenses are of no use to individuals who enter an 
exclusive agreement with an intermediary and then decide to permit 
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certain free uses of their works, for example because their works are not 
being disseminated by the intermediary for reasons of profitability. Once 
an exclusive transfer of rights has taken place, it is not possible for an 
author to sign other agreements with third parties, even if the subsequent 
agreements involve non-commercial use of the work.128 While the CC-
Plus protocol does not represent an ultimate solution to this problem, it 
does provide artists who anticipate such a risk for their own works with 
an instrument to exploit their works commercially and, at the same time, 
permit non-commercial use of their creations. 
A final point that should be emphasized is that the legal downloading 
services that have been developed with under the CC-Plus model may 
contribute to solving the problem of piracy. In a research study published 
in 2006, Carlos Ruiz De La Torre suggested that in order to attract 
consumers, a model legal downloading service should have the following 
seven features: (1) “offer a larger catalogue of downloadable music”; (2) 
“allow for compatibility of devices used by consumers for downloading, 
playback and storage”; (3) “offer individuals songs in addition to 
albums”; (4) “set affordable prices for downloads”; (5) “allow for 
reasonable personal uses of downloads by consumers, including the 
ability to make limited copies of recordings”; (6) “offer incentives, like 
sponsored downloads and prizes”; and (7) “provide security from 
computer viruses.” 129 
The three platforms analyzed above incorporate all of these features. 
Hence it is reasonable to expect that these websites might be able to 
compete with illegal downloading systems in the future. Should these 
new hybrid intermediaries become successful in attracting users, the 
volume of illegal sharing might significantly decrease. This should better 
enable authorities to enforce copyright law. At present, millions of users 
systematically infringe the law, despite being aware of their violation.130 
While it is harder to enforce the law with millions of infringing users, 
should the volume of piracy decrease significantly the risk of being sued 
for breach of copyright would probably increase. This might result in 
users being more respectful of the law. If so, the Internet community 
would probably start regarding the intellectual property regime as a set of 
rules that are effective in practice and not only in theory. 
                                                     
128 See Montagnani & Borghi, supra note 19, at 266. 
129 Carlos Ruiz de la Torre, Toward the Digital Music Distribution Age: Business Model 
Adjustments and Legislative Proposals to Improve Legal Downloading Services and Counter Piracy, 
8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 503, 505 (2006). 
130 See Herkko Hietanen et al., Criminal Friends of Entertainment: Analysing Results from 
Recent Peer-to-Peer Surveys, 5 SCRIPT-ED 31, 47 (2008). 
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E. Collection Societies 
Collection agencies were created in the nineteenth century by 
composers and publishers to help individual copyright holders enforce 
their statutory claims to exclusive use and remuneration. These 
organizations are primarily engaged in monitoring musical activity in a 
specific territory, so as to be able to handle collection and distribution of 
royalties accordingly.131 Collective management of copyright enables 
rights holders to benefit from economies of scale and scope, especially in 
the process of enforcing licenses. These scale and scope economies are 
positively associated with standardization of usage policies. Thus, if 
copyright owners could offer customized licenses to different users, 
collective management of rights would probably become more 
complicated and, consequently, more costly.132 Due to the fact that the 
Creative Commons licensing system is designed to empower authors to 
diversify contractual terms, several different collection agencies have 
been encountering problems while updating their structure in response to 
the rise of the Creative Commons licensing system. 
The SIAE is still in the process of developing a scheme that would 
enable member artists to license their works with Creative Commons.133 
At present, SIAE members have the ability to permit certain free uses of 
their works and still rely on SIAE for the collection and consequent 
distribution of their royalties. However, the provisions contained in 
Article 11 of the SIAE General Regulations limit these possibilities.134 
According to Article 11, artists may only relinquish their rights of 
reproduction and communication to the public. These exceptions, 
however, only apply to uses through data telecommunications networks. 
Therefore, SIAE’s statutory exceptions seem to differ in scope from the 
contents of Creative Commons licenses.135 As a result, an artist willing to 
                                                     
131 See Roger Wallis et al., Contested Collective Administration of Intellectual Property Rights 
in Music: The Challenge to the Principles of Reciprocity and Solidarity, 14 EUR. J. COMM. 5, 5. 
(1999). 
132 See Eric Brousseau & Christian Bessy, Public and Private Institutions in the Governance of 
Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INNOVATION, GOVERNANCE AND 
THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 243, 255 (Birgitte Andersen ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 
2006). 
133 In particular, artists that have granted SIAE an ad hoc mandate for the collection of 
revenues from commercial uses would be affected most by the introduction of such a scheme. 
134 See Regolamento Generale della Società Italiana degli Autori ed Editori, approvato 
dall’Assemblea nella riunione del 13 giugno 2007 [General Regulation of the SIAE, as Approved by 
the Assembly on June 13, 2007], SIAE 
http://www.siae.it/documents/BG_Normativa_Regolamentogenerale13-6-07.pdf?41134 (It.). 
135 In particular, these statutory exceptions do not seem to address all rights which must be 
cleared for online distribution of digital contents. With reference to online file sharing, see Creatività 
Remunerata, Conoscenza Liberata: File Sharing e Licenze Collettive Estese [Remunerated 
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license his or her works under a Creative Commons may choose to do so, 
provided that he or she is willing to manage copyright directly. 
A second possibility may exist; some of the new business ventures 
analyzed encourage their artists to join foreign collection societies, such 
as ASCAP or BMI, instead of joining SIAE.136 If an artist decides to join 
a foreign collection society, SIAE should assist the foreign agency in 
collecting royalties over the Italian territory. However, this option is 
conditioned on two requirements. First, members of the foreign 
collection society must have the option to permit free uses of their 
works.137 Second, the foreign collection society must have signed a 
reciprocal representation agreement with SIAE that does not preclude 
this practice. 
Whether these conditions are satisfied depends on the specific 
collection agency and on the specific reciprocal agreement under 
consideration. For the purpose of this Article, it suffices that the actual 
viability of this second option is still a source of great debate. 
Consequently, artists willing to follow the CC-Plus protocol to license 
their works are currently entitled to do so, except for the specific 
situations mentioned above, provided that they opt out of SIAE.138 This 
situation puts musicians in a very burdensome position as it forces them 
to carry out all monitoring activities required to enforce their copyright. 
The status quo does not seem favorable for the Creative Commons 
licenses. Even for the CC-Plus protocol there is still much improvement 
expected. For example, the Creative Commons Italia working group is 
engaged in negotiations with SIAE to work out a mandate enabling 
artists to use the Creative Commons licenses, or at least some of these 
                                                                                                                       
Creativity, Freed Knowledge: File Sharing and Extended Collective Licenses], NEXA (Nov. 12, 
2008), http://nexa.polito.it/sites/nexa.polito.it/files/NEXA-filesharing-marzo2009.pdf (It.). For an 
exhaustive description of the economic rights which must be secured, see Articles 12 through 19 of 
the Italian Law no. 633 of April 22, 1941, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/it/it112en.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).  
136 See, e.g., David d’Atri, Perchè Aspettare la SIAE?? Go ASCAP! [Why Wait for SIAE?? Go 
ASCAP!] (Feb. 5, 2008, 3:26 PM), http://lists.ibiblio.org/pipermail/cc-it/2008-February/003991.html 
(It.). 
137 For instance, in 2008 ASCAP officially recognized the artists’ right to decide when and 
where their “creative works may be used for free.” AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & 
PUBLISHERS, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SONGWRITERS AND COMPOSERS, available at 
http://www.ascap.com/rights/pdf/BillOfRights.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
138 See Gaia Bottà, SIAE e Creative Commons si Cercano, si Troveranno? [SIAE and Creative 
Commons Are Looking for Each Other, Will They Manage to Find Each Other?], 
PUNTOINFORMATICO (Dec. 2, 2008), http://punto-informatico.it/2493116/PI/News/siae-creative-
commons-si-cercano-si-troveranno.aspx (It.). 
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licenses, and simultaneously take advantage of the intermediation of 
SIAE to collect revenues from commercial uses of their works.139 
Not all countries are encountering these same problems. In many 
jurisdictions artists affiliated with the local collection society already 
have the option to use Creative Commons licenses.140 For example, the 
Dutch collection agency Buma/Stemra and the Danish Koda have 
already started to offer their affiliated artists the option of using Creative 
Commons licenses as an alternative to traditional copyright.141 Also, in 
May 2009, the Swedish collecting society Stim launched a two-year 
project aimed at testing the possibility of liberalizing the use of Creative 
Commons licenses. Consequently, Swedish artists are now allowed to 
license their works with Creative Commons and rely on Stim for the 
collection of their royalties.142 
F. Society as a Whole 
By adopting customary licensing schemes based on traditional all 
rights reserved copyright, artists may have problems trying to reconcile 
their commercial interest in creating a work with their goal of getting 
their works distributed as widely as possible.143 The CC-Plus protocol 
should help artists overcome this problem, providing them with a useful 
tool to give their works as much exposure as possible, thanks to the 
Creative Commons licenses employed, and simultaneously ensure an 
economic reward for their work, typically thanks to the role of some new 
intermediaries.  
This should have a two-fold effect on the volume of works available 
to the public for use and re-use. On the one hand, by granting a financial 
reward to artists, the CC-Plus protocol will continue to foster creation of 
                                                     
139 See Federico Morando, Faccia a Faccia tra CC e SIAE – La Stampa e La Repubblica [CC 
and SIAE Meet – La Stampa and La Repubblica], CREATIVE COMMONS (Dec. 1, 2008, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.creativecommons.it/node/693 (citing articles from both La Stampa and La Repubblica) 
(It.). 
140 See Collecting Society Projects, CREATIVE COMMONS 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Collecting_Society_Projects (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
141 See Riccardo Bagnato, Creative Commons e SIAE: Copyright al Tempo del Web [Creative 
Commons and SIAE: Copyright in the era of Internet], LA REPUBBLICA, (Nov. 27, 2008), 
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http://www.koda.dk/nyhedsbrev/nyhedsbreve-og-pm/presse/kodas-medlemmer-faar-mulighed-for-
at-bruge-creative-commons/ (Den.). 
142 See Collecting Society Projects, supra note 140; Swedish Performing Rights Society, Stim 
först i Sverige med Creative Commons-licens [STIM is the first to adopt Creative Commons in 
Sweden], STIM (May 29, 2009), http://www.stim.se/sv/PRESS/Pressmeddelanden/Stim-forst-i-
Sverige-med-Creative-Commons-licens/ (Swed.). 
143 See Montagnani & Borghi, supra note 19, at 251. 
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new art. Therefore, on the market’s input side, no significant changes 
should take place.144 On the other hand, the more flexible legal 
framework in which these new music platforms operate should enable 
easier access to works hosted by them. 
Implementation of the CC-Plus protocol might actually turn out to be 
good for the economy because sharing, sampling, and remixing activities 
have great economic potential through firms producing software and 
technologies that support these kinds of activities.145 Because of the 
wider opportunities for re-use available to the public, a new market for 
innovative products that facilitate sharing activities—for example, 
through physical supports or software infrastructure—may open up. 
Finally, the introduction of new intermediaries in the market might 
help break down the oligopoly currently controlling the music industry. 
With the development of digital music formats, economies of scale in the 
music industry have gradually vanished.146 Consequently, one of the last 
rationales for an oligopoly has been weakened.147 Therefore, society 
might benefit from an increase in competition. The deadweight loss for 
society resulting from just five labels controlling the market could be 
mitigated thanks to this change. 
VI. CURRENT ISSUES: PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THESE NEW 
BUSINESS MODELS 
To become established players in the digital music market, business 
ventures endorsing the CC-Plus protocol still have to overcome a few 
difficulties. 
First, as described above, the music platforms examined might not 
always have the power to assist artists in the process of enforcing their 
licenses.148 This might discourage musicians from contributing to these 
new projects. Second, artists willing to withdraw from collecting 
societies, like SIAE, might need assistance from these new music 
                                                     
144 One might argue that financial reward for artists would not be as strong as it is under the 
traditional copyright system. Yet, ways in which artists could still keep profiting (or even increase 
their profits) with the CC-Plus protocol have already been exposed. See supra, Part V.A. 
145 See LESSIG, supra note 99, at 88 (discussing the great economic potential of consumer 
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146 See Peitz & Waelbroeck, supra note 89, at 426. 
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KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS 388 (Worth Publishers ed. 2009). To understand 
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148 See supra Part V.E. 
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platforms to re-negotiate their previous contracts.149 Third, music 
licensees, in practice, might still encounter difficulties in proving to the 
authorities that they have rights to the tracks they are using. In Italy, for 
example, SIAE regularly carries out inspections all over the Italian 
territory. Jamendo, Beatpick, and Magnatune have each encountered 
difficulties in avoiding fines when dealing with local representatives of 
SIAE.150 
These issues represent a significant obstacle to a widespread 
adoption of the CC-Plus scheme. To overcome these problems, 
intermediaries endorsing the new protocol have to face all of the costs 
associated with the protection of their customers—for example, 
provision of appropriate legal assistance—and the costs of the 
negotiations that have to be conducted with collection societies and other 
authorities.151 
As with many innovative projects, one of the main hurdles for these 
new business models is that of gaining enough visibility to attract more 
artists and users to their websites. Despite evidence of prominent growth 
rates for these new websites, Creative Commons licenses are still 
unknown to many artists and users.152 The CC-Plus protocol, as well as 
the cost-saving opportunities offered by it, is just starting to be explored 
by players in the music industry. In regards to this issue, Magnatune’s 
initiative of advertising its website through tracks made available for free 
downloading appears to be a suitable strategy to gain further exposure. 
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